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43
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 19, n. 74, p. 9 - 65. 2016
normatively desirable, is unlikely to occur in the near future.
Current norms of private international law, however, provide a
vehicle for improving the extant state of affairs. Courts should
enforce provisions in corporate charters which specify which
country’s or countries’ bankruptcy law should apply when the
firm encounters financial distress. Adhering to party choice
would replace the current muddle of laws surrounding trans-
national insolvencies with a more coherent approach".
92
Analisando a proposta do professor Robert Rasmussen, Jay Wes-
tbrook elogia o fato de que a teoria não deixou de lidar com a questão
da execução desse regime contratual do devedor pelas Cortes nacionais,
uma vez que propunha soluções para esse reconhecimento, porém a cri-
ticou por não oferecer uma proteção efetiva ao controle de bens e prio-
ridades dos credores, bem como por carecer de transparência adequada
para processos dessa natureza:
"One of the attractive elements in Professor Rasmussen’s ap-
proach is that he does not forget that government will have
to enforce the regime he proposes. Another attractive ele-
ment is that the lawmaker’s job is very simple. Thus, an inter-
national convention would presumably provide that all the
contracting countries would enforce the requirement that
every company’s article of incorporation contain a choice-of-
-bankruptcy procedure from the menu and that the choice
could be not changed without the agreement of every cre-
ditor […]. I will address, however, two objection that have
particular saliency internationally.
All contractual approaches to law rest on the basic argument
that, assuming a perfect market and no transaction costs,
parties will always adopt the most efficient bargain. There-
fore, any legal constraint on that bargain must be irrelevant
or inefficient. The constraint is irrelevant to the extent it per-
mits the bargain to be struck, and inefficient to the extent it
changes the terms of the private bargain. In the debtor-credi-
tor context, this syllogism supports a bankruptcy law that has
little or no content, except to enforce the bargain between
92 RASMUSSEN, Robert K.
A New Approach to …,
p. 36.