41 / 210
39
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 19, n. 74, p. 9 - 65. 2016
teriormente conduziu a um árduo debate acadêmico com Jay Westbrook,
registrado em simpósio realizado na Universidade de Michigan.
O territorialismo cooperativo de Lynn LoPucki também defende a
existência de vários processos falimentares, porém os entende como in-
dependentes e paralelos, sem qualquer vínculo de sujeição entre eles.
Esses processos são abertos nos locais em que o devedor tiver bens situ-
ados. Porém, inobstante descentralizados, os órgãos da falência de cada
um possuem o dever de se ajudarem mutuamente, em prol da coopera-
ção na insolvência. Isso traria, na visão do professor, uma séria de van-
tagens, tal como evitar que a manipulação da sede do devedor (
home
country
)
levasse ao
forum shopping
, bem como impedir a ocorrência de
ofensa à soberania dos países e aos créditos individuais:
"Under the cooperative territoriality system I propose, the
bankruptcy courts of a country will administer the assets of
a multinational debtor within the borders of that country as
a separate state. If a debtor had significant assets in seve-
ral countries, several independent bankruptcy cases might
result. None would be main, secondary, or ancillary. […] To
illustrate the worldwide operation of a cooperative territorial
bankruptcy system, assume again that the United States is
the home country of a debtor with worldwide operations.
Each of the fillings would be of equal dignity. Each of the
bankruptcy courts would assume jurisdiction over the local
assets, would determine whether to cooperate in a multi-
national reorganization or liquidation, and in the event of li-
quidation, each would distribute the assets of the company
among creditors and shareholders under local law".
82
Lynn LoPucki sustenta, ainda, que o territorialismo cooperativo se-
ria o melhor para lidar com a complexa questão de insolvência transna-
bankruptcy cases and concludes that a cooperative form of territoriality would work best. Universalism, the system
that currently dominates the scholarship, diplomacy, and jurisprudence of international company’s “home country”
should have worldwide control and should apply the home country’s law to the core issues of the case. Universalism
is unworkable, however, because the links that define the “home countries” of multinational companies are so
ephemeral and manipulable that the resulting system would be unpredictable. Modified universalism, secondary
bankruptcy, and Rasmussen’s corporate-charter contractualism, each of which will be discussed below, are similarly
flawed. Territoriality, a system in which each country has jurisdiction over the portion of the multinational company
within its borders, would provide the best foundation for international cooperation. A system of cooperative terri-
toriality is optimal even though it potentially requires multiple filing and prosecution of claims, cooperation among
courts and administrators with respect to particular reorganizations and liquidations, and international agreements
to control fleeing assets. LOPUCKI, Lynn M. "
Cooperation in International Bankruptcy…"
, p. 696.
82 LOPUCKI, Lynn M. "
Cooperation in International Bankruptcy…"
, p. 742-743.