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beu apoio, no simpósio da Universidade de Michigan, de doutrinadores
renomados, como, v.g., do professor Andrew T. Guzman88, inobstante
houvesse algumas divergências89.
A outro giro, não se poderia deixar de registrar o sistema sugerido
pelo professor norte-americano Robert K. Rasmussen, desenvolvido ini-
cialmente também na década de 9090. Seu modelo ficou conhecido como
Contratualismo (Contractualism), por permitir ao devedor escolher, por
via contratual, o foro competente e a lei aplicável ao procedimento de
insolvência. Cada sociedade estaria livre para escolher o regime falimen-
tar ou recuperacional, devendo tal decisão ser tomada no momento da
constituição (incorporation) e estar prevista em seu contrato, só podendo
ser alterada com o consentimento unânime dos credores91:
"Transnational bankruptcies are becoming an ever increasing
event in the global economy. To date, the legal regime has
responded to the problem by either ignoring it, or through
modest efforts at governmental regulation. Both responses
are unsatisfactory. Ideally, if countries would forgo their insis-
tence on mandating the content of the bankruptcy law, each
firm would, at the time of its formation, select its insolvency
regime from a menu of bankruptcy options.
Such fundamental change in transnational bankruptcy, while
88 “Although Professor Westbrook and I approach the subject of international bankruptcies from somewhat di-
fferent perspectives, we hold very similar views of the preferred policy prescription. With this in mind, and in the
interest of space, I will not address his arguments directly in this Article. If I did, it would be primarily to express my
support for his views”. GUZMAN, Andrew T. International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism. Berkeley Law
Scholarship Repository, p. 2180. Disponível em: <
758&context=facpubs >. Acesso em: 16.05.2016.
89 “Professor Guzman is a thorough-going universalist who is not committed to a contractual solution to the inter-
national bankruptcy problem, so I begin by agreeing with many of the points he makes. His article is devoted to the
efficiency arguments that turn on the reduction of costs as a function of predictability of result. I largely agree with
those arguments, but I must disagree with him in two respects: these arguments are not new to the literature and
they have probably been overstated”. WESTBROOK, Jay Lawrence. A Global Solution to… , p. 2326.
90 Veja-se: RASMUSSEN, Robert K. Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy. 71 Texas Law
Review, 71:51, 1992-1993. Disponível em: /
tlr71&div=9&id=&page=>. Acesso em: 16.05.2016; RASMUSSEN, Robert K. A New Approach to Transnational Insol-
vencies. 19 Michigan Journal of International Law, v. 19:1, 1997-1998. Disponível em: <
LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/mjil19&div=8&id=&page= >. Acesso em: 16.05.2016; e RASMUSSEN, Robert K.
Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering. Michigan Law Review, v. 98 (2000). Disponível em:
>. Acesso em: 16.05.2016.
91 “Other changes in the bankruptcy term would be more problematic. As described above, a firm should not have
complete freedom to change from a Chapter 7-only selection to a Chapter 11 selection. Yet at times such a change
may be necessary given the change in the nature of the firm. For example, a publicly held firm going private in a
leveraged buyout might find a Chapter 11 proceeding to be the optimal bankruptcy term. In this situation, change
in the corporate charter should be allowed only with the consent of all of the creditors”. RASMUSSEN, Robert K.
Debtor’s Choice…, p. 118.