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R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 19, n. 74, p. 9 - 65. 2016
32
fere tratamento desigual aos credores, o que violaria os princípios básicos
do direito falimentar brasileiro e mundial. Jean-Philippe Maslin traz, em
sua lição, mais algumas fraquezas desse sistema e elucida as consequên-
cias econômicas do tratamento desigual de credores:
"The resulting piecemeal dismemberment of the debtor’s as-
sets is sure to induce a lack of equality in treatment of the
creditors, or even spoliation of some of the foreign creditors.
Territorialism also provokes
ex ante
strategic thinking in the
creation of the entity, as for example debtors will incorporate
their companies more willingly in countries unfriendly to cre-
ditors basing their claims on allegations of tort. This pheno-
menon is often referred to as “forum shopping” […]. Finally,
the preference given to domestic creditors by territorialism
regimes creates a distortion in the efficiency of the interna-
tional setting for bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, if domes-
tic creditors have a higher chance of being paid, they will the-
refore offer lower interest rates on the loans of the financial
operations they propose. Distortion will result as debtors are
motivated to preferably organize their activities in territoria-
lism regimes which are favorable for the establishment of the
company but not for its liquidation."
62
Conforme se vê, o territorialismo, além de igualmente possi-
bilitar a ocorrência do
forum shopping,
gera, ainda, o risco do encare-
cimento de crédito, afinal as instituições bancárias embutirão nos juros
o cálculo dos riscos de não receber seu crédito. Saliente-se, ainda, dou-
trina que advoga que o territorialismo não está em consonância com o
atual intento cooperativo do hodierno cenário globalizado. Ao limitar os
efeitos de decisão apenas ao âmbito territorial e levar a uma pluralidade
de processos de insolvência, o sistema territorialista opta, segundo essa
creases liquidation values and makes coordination of cases extremely complex. Third, conflicts between jurisdictions
and courts can easily develop. Fourth, creditors cannot know in advance where the debtor’s assets will be located
when bankruptcy intervenes, which causes a less efficient ex ante allocation of capital. Fifth, distribution results are
both uneven, violating the bankruptcy principle of treating the cost of capital because of the uncertain outcome
if insolvency supervenes. Finally, under territorialism, both debtor and individual creditors can engage in strategic
behavior to advance their private interest at the expense of the general interests of creditors”. BUFFORD, Samuel L.
"
Global Venue…"
, p. 114.
62 MASLIN, Jean-Philippe.
The Effectiveness of European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation as a Tool Against
Forum-Shopping
. (2009). Disponível em:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1539391>. Acesso em: 17.03.2016, p. 5.