374 / 432
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 20, n. 79, p. 348 - 376, Maio/Agosto 2017
374
of the day, Pizarro is simply endorsing the kind of punitive relief that has
already emerged in the civil-law realm, not the wider-ranging variant that
prevails in the United States.
Of course, the Ecuadorian Civil Code’s Article 18(7a) establishes
that, in the absence of a legal norm applicable to the controversy at hand
or to analogous cases, an adjudicator may turn to “the principles of
universal law.”
121
It thus echoes its counterparts all over Latin America and
Continental Europe.
122
All the same, this provision does not entitle judges
to apply any imaginable rule to settle the disputes before them. Instead,
it creates a narrow exception, which should not undermine the judiciary’s
overriding obligation to adjudicate, strictly, according to what the Code
spells out and explicitly commands.
Consequently, a tribunal must, in applying Article 18(7a) or its
equivalents throughout the civil-law universe, first show that no legal
norm exists for the case or for any similar controversy. Since the Civil
Code comprehensively governs civil-law suits, it does not leave a vacuum
of this sort. In fact, it covers all kinds of tort claims, including those
pertaining to injuries alleged to have occurred due to “serious culpability,
serious negligence, extreme culpability,” or even due to “malice (
dolo
),”
which “consists in the positive intention to visit harm upon someone else
or upon his or her property.”
123
In addition, the Code provides for a wide array of remedies, such as
indemnification,
124
reparation,
125
and evenmoral compensation.
126
In a typical
fashion, it does not authorize punitive damages under any circumstances. In
any event, inasmuch as courts have at their disposal positive law to address
questions of liability and relief, Article 18(7a) does not apply.
Even in the absence of relevant legal parameters, a judge seeking to
rely on Article 18(7a) must, additionally, point to a pertinent principle of
universal law. As just noted, Latin American and Continental European
121
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18(7a) (“A falta de ley, se aplicarán las que existan sobre casos análogos; y no habiéndo-
las, se ocurrirá a los principios del derecho universal.”).
122
See
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Arg.) (2016), art. 2;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Chile) (1857, art. 24;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Colom.) (1873), art. 32;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(C.R.)
(1886), art. 11;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18(6a & 7a);
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Hond.) (1906), art. 20;
C
d
. C
iv
.
F
ed
. (Mex.) (1928),
arts. 18 & 19;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Para.) (1985), art. 6;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Peru) (1930), art. VIII;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(P.R.) (1930), art. 7;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Uru.)
(1868), art. 16;
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Venez.) (1982), art. 4.
123
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 29 (“Culpa grave, negligencia grave, culpa lata”) (“El dolo consiste en la intención posi-
tiva de irrogar injuria a la persona o propiedad de otro.”).
124
Id.
arts. 2214-2216.
125
Id.
art. 2229.
126
Id.
arts. 2231-2234.