369 / 432
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 20, n. 79, p. 348 - 376, Maio/Agosto 2017
369
principles, and confront fewer due-process limitations when interacting with
their opponent in court.
An enactment that thus accords citizens standing to enforce the
community’s diffuse rights would seem not to qualify as just ceremonial
precisely because it brings about such a major alteration in the legal order.
In the terms of the Civil Code, it would not appear simply to “concern the
substantiation [or] the rituality of lawsuits.”
94
Ultimately, such a law, upon
retroactive deployment, tends to impose on potential defendants exactly the
kind of extra burden that the bar on retroactivity aims to spare them.
At this juncture, the complainant could attempt an alternative tack.
Instead of purporting to categorize the
ex post facto
statute as procedural,
she might assert that it basically boils down to a reenactment of already
existing laws entitling individuals to sue. She might first zero in on Civil-
Code provisions that institute the right to prosecute a suit in tort.
For example, Article 2214 essentially declares that whoever harms
someone else through an illicit act has an obligation to indemnify the
injured party.
95
Similarly, Article 2229 generally requires people to repair
any damage that they cause through malice or negligence.
96
The claimant
may argue that these provisions, which obviously have equivalents
throughout the civil-law universe,
97
contain the substantive law upon
which her action rests. She may maintain that they may serve to address
diffuse injuries to the society as a whole.
Nevertheless, this interpretation entails problematic consequences.
Articles 2214 and 2229 posit ordinary tort actions through which plaintiffs
vindicate their own individual entitlements, rather than the community’s
diffuse rights. The judiciary would be transforming these provisions if it read
94
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7(20a) (“la sustanciación y ritualidad de los juicios”).
95
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2214 (“Whoever commits a criminal or negligent offense that injures someone else, bears
an obligation to indemnify, without prejudice to the legally imposed punishment for the offense.”) (“El que ha cometido
un delito o cuasidelito que ha inferido daño a otro, está obligado a la indemnización; sin perjuicio de la pena que le im-
pongan las leyes por el delito o cuasidelito.”).
96
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2229 (“As a general rule, a person shall repair any harm attributable to his or her malice
or negligence.”) (“Por regla general todo daño que pueda imputarse a malicia o negligencia de otra persona debe ser
reparado por ésta.”).
97
See, e.g.
,
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Braz.) (2003), art. 927 (“Whoever harms another by an illicit act shall bear an obligation to repair the
harm.”) (“Aquele que, por ato ilícito, causar dano a outrem, fica obrigado a repará-lo.”);
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Chile) (1857), art. 2329
(“As a general rule, a person shall repair any harm attributable to his or her malice or negligence.”) (“Por regla general todo
daño que pueda imputarse a malicia o negligencia de otra persona, debe ser reparado por ésta.”);
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Fr.) (1804), art.
1382 (“Whoever culpably harms another shall bear an obligation to repair the harm.”) (“Tout fait quelconque de l’homme,
qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer. ”);
C
d
. C
iv
. (P.R.) (1930), art. 1802
(“Whoever harms another by a culpable or negligent act or omission shall bear an obligation to repair the harm.”) (“El
que por acción u omisión causa daño a otro, interviniendo culpa o negligencia, está obligado a reparar el daño causado.”).