373 / 432
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 20, n. 79, p. 348 - 376, Maio/Agosto 2017
373
states to decline to apply statutes from other European-Union countries on
the basis of “considerations of public interest,” specifically when the law in
question calls on the judiciary to “award . . . non-compensatory exemplary
or punitive damages of an excessive nature.”
111
Nonetheless, commentators like Ramón Daniel Pizarro have endorsed
the incorporation of a punitive component in civil indemnification under
limited circumstances.
112
Significantly, this author actually acknowledges
the traditional stance and cautions that “punitive damages have not
attained much recognition in the Continental European system or in Latin
America.”
113
He specifically notes that the punishment of “intentional torts”
or of “gross negligence” faces “serious difficulties,” mostly due to “
the lack
of norms
for the imposition of civil sanctions in such cases.”
114
Aiming to transcend a mere “description of the system,”
115
however,
Pizarro advocates the “future”
116
adoption, in Argentina, of this institution,
as a “useful instrument,”
117
under “exceptional” and “restricted”
118
circumstances. Not surprisingly, he addresses his proposal to lawmakers
and insists that it requires express legislation prior to application. He
underscores, using his own italics, “the absolute necessity of providing for
such penalties by
law
.”
119
“Punishment,” he explains, “must be expressly
established in the law in order to forestall an encroachment upon basic
notions of legal certainty that the Constitution consecrates.”
120
At the end
111 Council Regulation 864/2007 (On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations) (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L.
199/40) (EC), Consideration 32.
112
R
amón
D
aniel
P
izarro
,
D
erecho de
D
años
287-337 (Ch. XIII (“Daños Punitivos”)) (1996).
113
Id
. at 295 (“Los daños punitivos no han alcanzado mayor repercusión dentro el sistema de Europa Continental ni en
Latinoamérica.”). Elsewhere, Pizarro states that, “among us [in Argentina], as well as in most countries in Continental
Europe and Latin America, [punitive damages] have not attained much recognition.”
Id
. at 287 (“Sin embargo, entre
nosotros —y en la mayor parte de los países de Europa continental y de Latinoamérica— [los daños punitivos] no han
alcanzado mayor repercusión.”). He notes, in particular, that civil-law literature has attributed “little importance . . . to the
punitive dimension
of tort law.”
Id
. at 289 (“Llama la atención la poca importancia que nuestra doctrina ha prestado a la
faz
punitiva
del derecho de daños.”).
114
Id
. at 290 (“agravia intencionado”; “de una grosera negligencia”; “serias dificultades”; “la ausencia de normas que permiten
sanciones civiles en tales supuestos”).
See also id.
at 291 (“The problems relating to the punishment of certain torts” stem from
“a glaring lack of adequate normative principles”) & 297 (“In Latin America . . ., punitive damages find few antecedents.”).
115
Id
. at 288 (“descripción del sistema”).
116
Id
. at 287 (“futura”).
See also id.
at 291 & 336. Pizarro asserts that “punitive damages in the common law constitute
one of the possible parameters for consideration in the formulation of future legislation.”
Id
. at 291. Nonetheless, he
acknowledges that comparative efforts in the civil-law tradition usually restrict themselves “to Continental European law
and to the Latin American system” and rarely focus on “the common law and its institutions.”
Id
. at 288.
117
Id
. at 287 (“instrumento útil”).
118
Id
. at 336 (“excepcional”; “restrictiva”).
119
Id
. at 336 (“la necesidad indispensable de consagrar tales puniciones por
ley
.”).
120
Id
. at 290 (“las penas deben estar expresamente provistas por la ley, so riesgo de afectar elementales principios de
seguridad jurídica que consagra la Constitución nacional.”)