361 / 432
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 20, n. 79, p. 348 - 376, Maio/Agosto 2017
361
intent. Throughout the region, one must interpret a contract to mean A if one
ascertains that the parties intended this meaning. One must do so whether the
text says A or B and, of course, when it allows either interpretation.
C. Third-Party Contracts
In consequence, the judiciary in Latin America, as in the civil-law
tradition as a whole, should normally base itself on the intent of the
parties in order to decide whom the contract benefits or entitles and how
or to what exactly. It should first turn to the text for guidance, but may
have to look beyond to discover what precisely the parties intended. If
they meant to confer a benefit or a right to another person in a certain
manner, they should have their way, independently of whether the ensuing
document affirms so or not. Latin American legal systems do not exempt
such agreements from the core precepts of contractual interpretation, let
alone advance alternative exegetical fundaments.
The so-called principle of “contractual relativity,”
56
which often prevails
in the civil-law world and which establishes that “contracts only obligate and
bind the parties,”
57
should not alter the analysis. It merely constitutes a default
norm with numerous exceptions.
58
In fact, many of the very laws that espouse
the concept also unequivocally legitimate third-party accords.
For instance, Argentina’s 2016 Civil Code embraces, in its Article
1021, this “General Rule”: “A contract generates effects only among the
contracting parties; not with respect to third parties, except as provided
by law.”
59
To avoid any misunderstanding, it adds the following, in
its Article 1022, on “Third Parties”: “A contract does not give rise to
obligations on the part of third parties. Moreover, third parties have
no right to invoke it to impose obligations not agreed upon on the
contracting parties, except as provided by law.”
60
56
See
,
e.g.
,
P
ilar
J
iménez
B
lanco
, E
l
contrato
internacional
a
favor de
tercero
33 (Imprenta Universitaria: Santiago
de Compostela, Spain) (2002) (“relatividad contractual”).
57
Id
. (“los contratos sólo obligan y vinculan a las partes del mismo”).
58
See
Aníbal Torres Vásquez,
Contrato en favor de tercero
, at 14 (originally published as
A
níbal
T
orres
V
ásquez
, Ch. IX
(
Contrato en favor de tercero
), Vol. II,
T
eoría
general
del
contrato
(Instituto Pacífico: Lima) (2012)) (on file with the au-
thor) (“Sin embargo, el principio de la relatividad del contrato no es absoluto, porque el ordenamiento jurídico permite
que el contrato pueda producir sus efectos favorables en cabeza de un tercero; así sucede cuando uno de los contratantes
tiene interés en obtener que la otra parte ejecute su prestación ante un tercero beneficiario, atribuyéndole a este último el
derecho de exigirla.”) (“Nonetheless, the principle of contractual relativity is not absolute. The law allows a contract to
produce effects favorable to a third party. For instance, one of the contracting parties may have an interest in his coun-
terparty performing an action for the benefit of a third-party beneficiary. He thus grants the latter the right to enforce
the agreement”).
See also id
. at 55.
59 Cd. Civ. (Arg.) (2016), art. 1021 (“Regla general: El contrato sólo tiene efecto entre las partes contratantes; no lo tiene
con respecto a terceros, excepto en los casos previstos por la ley.”).
60
Id
. art. 1022 (“Situación de los terceros: El contrato no hace surgir obligaciones a cargo de terceros, ni los terceros tienen
derecho a invocarlo para hacer recaer sobre las partes obligaciones que éstas no han convenido, excepto disposición legal.”).