360 / 432
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 20, n. 79, p. 348 - 376, Maio/Agosto 2017
360
means. Nonetheless, they should privilege the intention over the contractual
text in the face of a demonstrable divergence.
Other relevant parts of Peru’s Civil Code support this reading. Article
1356, for instance, bears the heading “Primacy of the Intent of the Contracting
Parties” and provides that: “Except when mandatory, legal rules on contracts are
subject to the intent of the parties.”
52
Likewise, Articles 1362 and 1352 establish,
respectively, that: “Contracts shall be negotiated, executed, and complied with,
in accordance with good faith and the common intent of the parties”
53
and
generally “come about simply through the consent of the parties. . . .”
54
Consequently, courts throughout Latin America, including Peru,
must construe a contract to entail A if they find that the parties expected
this entailment. They must do so whether the text states A or B and,
naturally, when it permits either construction. Coincidentally, the legal
order in these countries does not impose any special restrictions, such as
the common-law “parol evidence rule,”
55
on the submission of proof in the
inquiry into the aim of the parties.
A Paraguayan and a Chilean adjudicator, for example, would each
refer to A, in turn, as (1) the “common intention of the parties” into
which one should inquire “rather than limit oneself to the literal sense
of the words” and (2) the clear “intention of the contracting parties” that
carries “more weight than the contract’s literal words.” Analogously, a
Peruvian litigant who proves A to be “the intent of the parties” overcomes
any presumption in favor of “the terms contained in the contract.” He or
she may thereby reinforce the document in writing if convergent, clarify it
if ambiguous, or trump it if divergent.
In sum, Latin American law, as part of its civil-law heritage, usually
requires reading a contract on the basis of the parties’ joint intention. It
commands enforcing the latter, when plainly ascertainable, even if at odds with
the eventually executed instrument. Along parallel lines, Peru’s Civil Code
necessitates disregarding the contractual wording upon proof of a contrary
52
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Peru) (1984), art. 1356 (“Primacía de la voluntad de contratantes”; “Las disposiciones de la ley sobre contra-
tos son supletorias de la voluntad de las partes, salvo que sean imperativas.”).
53 Cd. Civ. (Peru) (1984), art. 1362 (“Los contratos deben negociarse, celebrarse y ejecutarse según las reglas de la buena
fe y común intención de las partes.”).
54 Cd. Civ. (Peru) (1984), art. 1352 (“Los contratos se perfeccionan por el consentimiento de las partes. . . .”).
55
See
Arthur Corbin,
The Parol Evidence Rule
, 53
Y
ale
L.J.
603, 603 (1944) (“When two parties have made a contract and
have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract,
evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose
of varying or contradicting the writing.”).