367 / 432
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 20, n. 79, p. 348 - 376, Maio/Agosto 2017
367
procedural for purposes of retroactive application, it could end up hollowing
out the ban on
ex post facto
laws. Tribunals must, therefore, rationally and
restrictively construe the exemption for legislation that exclusively regards
procedure. They must examine the invoked enactment in its entirety before
classifying it as strictly formal and deploying it retroactively.
A complex, concrete controversy in which a complainant rests her claim
for damages on a newly enacted statute may help illustrate the intricacies of
the issue. For instance, she may file a genuinely collective or diffuse action
under an environmental law, such as Ecuador’s Environmental Management
Act,
88
or an equivalent enactment elsewhere in the region.
89
Article 43 of the
Ecuadorian statute provides that “persons, legal entities, [and] groups of people
united by a common interest and directly affected by the injurious action or
omission may sue . . . for damages in relation to any sanitary or environmental
harm.”
90
It emphasizes that environmental rights are “collective” and “shared
by the community” and explicates “diffuse interest[s],” somewhat confusingly,
as “homogeneous and indivisible interests held by indeterminate groups of
individuals tied by common circumstances.”
91
Consequently, the claimant would apparently be basing her suit on
a substantively new enactment that profoundly alters the state of the law.
When the contested conduct occurred, the legal system entitled her to
seek compensation, under the Civil Code, when someone “negligently or
culpably” injured her personally.
92
Since then, it additionally empowers
her to demand reparation for any generalized harm to the environment
and to the community’s health.
88 L. 77, L. Gestión Ambiental (Ecuad.) (1999).
89
See, e.g.
,
C
onst
. (Braz.) (1988), art. 5(LXXIII) (“[A]ny citizen or party with standing [may] file a popular action seeking
to annul . . . state action that impinges . . . upon the environment.”) (“[Q]ualquer cidadão e parte legítima [pode] propor
ação popular que vise a anular ato lesivo . . . de entidade de que o Estado participe, . . . ao meio ambiente.”); L. 24 (Pan.)
(1995), art. 78 (“Any person may file, under this law, an environmental public action . . . regarding not an individual or
direct injury, but rather a threat or injury to diffuse interests or to the interests of a collectivity.”) (“En cumplimiento
de la presente Ley, toda persona podrá interponer acción pública ambiental, sin necesidad de asunto previo cuando por
su naturaleza no exista una lesión individual o directa, sino que atañe a los intereses difusos o a los intereses de la colec-
tividad.”); L. 28237,
C
d
. P
rocesal
C
onst
. (Peru) (2004), art. 40 (“Likewise, any person may file for a writ of protection
when a threat to or a violation of environmental or other diffuse rights that have constitutional stature is at stake. . . .”)
(“Asimismo, puede interponer demanda de amparo cualquier persona cuando se trate de amenaza o violación del derecho
al medio ambiente u otros derechos difusos que gocen de reconocimiento constitucional. . . .”).
90 L. 77, L. Gestión Ambiental (Ecuad.) (1999), art. 43 (“Las personas naturales, jurídicas o grupos humanos, vincu-
lados por un interés común y afectados directamente por la acción u omisión dañosa podrán interponer ante el Juez
competente, acciones por daños y perjuicios y por el deterioro causado a la salud o al medio ambiente incluyendo la
biodiversidad con sus elementos constitutivos.”).
91
Id.
, Glosario de Definiciones (“Derechos Ambientales Colectivos”) (“Son aquellos compartidos por la comunidad. .
. .”) (“Inter[eses] Difuso[s]”) (“intereses homogéneos y de naturaleza indivisible, cuyos titulares son grupos indetermina-
dos de individuos ligados por circunstancias comunes.”).
92
C
d
. C
iv
.
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2214 (“ha inferido daño”);
id.
, art. 2229 (“malicia o negligencia”).