Revista da EMERJ - V. 21 - N. 3 - Setembro/Dezembro - 2019 - Tomo 1

67  R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 3, t. 1, p. 55-71, set.-dez., 2019  TOMO 1 autonomy of the legal system, in Germany at least a relative autonomy of the law is widely accepted. This concept acknowledges on the one hand that law is a political product. It emerges from the legislative process, where political arguments dominate. On the other hand, once enacted the law is disconnected from politics. It is up to the legislature to decide whether a legal norm remains in force or not. But as long as it is in force its application does not follow political criteria. It is not only a difference in the institutional setting of political and judicial decisions. There is also a specific rationality of the legal system, which differs from the rationality of the political system. This difference is not without impact on the recruitment and the behaviour of judges. If interpretation and application of the law is regarded as a political operation, the political preferences and affiliations of the judges are important, whereas they do not matter as much when the neutralizing effect of legal rationality is recognized. The degree of politicization of the judiciary is linked to this. It explains at the same time the constant concern of the American constitutionalists as well as the American public with the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty or the undemocratic character of judicial review, which is more or less absent in Germany and other countries where the establishment of judicial review was a reaction to the experience with non-democratic regimes. An inside perspective of a constitutional court can confirm the extent to which doctrine and methodology are able to bridge ideological differences. During my term on the bench I could observe that decisions were not necessarily result-driven. Legal arguments mattered and it happened quite often that members of the court changed their mind because of the arguments exchanged in the deliberation. Of course, this observation in one court cannot be generalized. But it certainly shows the importance of requiring judges to give reasons for a decision. It is true that there may be good reasons for different results, but it is also true that not every result can be supported by legal reasons. Which method guides the German Constitutional Court when it decides constitutional conflicts? Authentic descriptions by the Court itself are rare, and where they appear in an opinion they do not come in form of a systematic and coherent explanation. Courts hardly discuss methodological questions, let alone describe in their opinions which method they followed.