Revista da EMERJ - V. 21 - N. 3 - Setembro/Dezembro - 2019 - Tomo 1

63  R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 3, t. 1, p. 55-71, set.-dez., 2019  TOMO 1 reacting to various challenges, inspired by different interests or concepts of justice and depending on the use of ordinary language. Filling the gaps, harmonizing the contradicting provisions, rendering them precise enough for the decision of an issue is the task of the appliers of law, in the last resort of the courts, which, in turn, draw profit from the efforts of legal science. But even if provisions are formulated as clearly and as coherently as possible they can raise questions when it comes to solving a concrete case. This incapacity to guarantee a full determination of legal decisions, even in the case of seemingly clear provisions, is inherent in the law because a law is by definition a general rule applicable to an indefinite number of cases arising in the future. This is why it must be formulated in more or less abstract terms. Consequently, there will always remain a gap between the general and abstract norm on the one hand and the concrete and individual case on the other. The judge has to discover what the general norm means with regard to the case at hand. This is achieved by interpretation, which always precedes the application of the norm. The general norm must be concretized as a more specific rule before the individual case can be decided. Like the task of filling gaps, harmonizing contradicting provisions and clarifying vague norms, concretization contains a creative element. Norm application must therefore always to some certain extent involve norm-construction. This is undisputable, though the degree can vary and rests on a number of variables. The most important one is the precision of a norm. A narrowly tailored norm leaves less room for the constructive element whereas a broad or even vague normrequires a lot of concretization before it is fit for application to a case. Usually a constitution will contain more vague norms than, say, the code of civil procedure. This is certainly true for the guiding principles and for fundamental rights, less so for organizational and procedural norms. Another variable is the age of a norm; the older a norm, the larger the number of problems that were not or could not have been foreseen by the legislature, and thus the broader the range of questions of meaning and applicability. The mere fact that the law does not fully determine judgment in individual cases is not sufficient to turn law application from a legal into a political operation. It remains a legal operation if what the judge adds to