Revista da EMERJ - V. 21 - N. 2 - Maio/Agosto - 2019
R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 2, p. 11-39, Maio-Agosto, 2019 20 wide. 30 The Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, as adopted by the American Law Institute and Unidroit in 2004, provide: “The court and the judges should have judicial independence to decide the dispute according to the facts and the law, including freedom from improper internal and external influence”. 31 Promoting judicial independence requires, of course, the com- plementarity and the interplay between different substantive elements: recruitment, tenures, salaries, discipline, immunity, physical security, administrative autonomy, training, and so on. 32 First of all, however, judicial independence requires that certain institutional and procedural devices are adopted; that is, bodies and proceedings in charge of ensuring its realisation and able to react against violation and interference by other (public and private) entities. In Europe, a great divide exists between legal systems in which ju- dicial independence is ensured through a high council of the judiciary, such as in the Italian, and those in which it is not, such as in the German legal system. 33 In the last decades, the trend is towards an expansion of the high council system 34 . The Italian High Council of the Judiciary ( Con- siglio Superiore della Magistratura , the ‘CSM’), one of the oldest councils for the judiciary in Europe (it was established by Art. 104 Const. and began functioning in 1958), 35 has played a leading role in this trend. It is a model for developing independent judicial councils across Europe and has taken part in “twinning projects” 36 that support high councils for the judiciary in 30 Cf. e.g. S. Shetreet, J. Deschênes (eds.), Judicial Independence, The Contemporary Debate, M. Nijhoff, 1985; S.B. Burbank, B. Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, An Interdisciplinary Approach, Sage Publications, 2002; A. Seibert-Fohr, L.F. Müller (eds.), Judicial Independence in Transition, Springer, 2012. 31 Cf. Ali/Unidroit Principle no. 1.1. Cf. also Art. 6, para 1 European Convention of Human Rights; Art. 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 32 V.C. Jackson , Judicial Independence: Structure, Context, Attitude, A. Seibert Fohr, L.F. Müller (eds.), Judicial Indepen- dence in Transition, Springer, 2012, p. 19 ff. 33 Cf. European Network of Council for the Judiciary, ENCJ, www.encj.eu. 34 Cf. B. Hess, G. Dimitropoulos (eds.), Judicial Reforms in Luxembourg and Europe, Nomos, 2014. 35 In the Italian legal system, a Superior Council of the Judiciary was first established by a law of 1907, but it was merely a consultative body to the Minister of Justice, who had the ultimate say in matters of the recruitment, assignment, transfer, promotion and disciplinary measures affecting judges and prosecutors. One year later a disciplinary court was established. Cf. R. Caponi, Judicial Independence in Italy – The Role of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, B. Hess, G. Dimi- tropoulos (eds.), Judicial Reforms in Luxembourg and Europe, Nomos, 2014, p. 135ff. 36 Twinning projects are one of the tools introduced by the European Union within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to strengthen relations between the European Union and its neighbours.
Made with FlippingBook
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NTgyODMz