Revista da EMERJ - V. 20 - N. 2 - Maio/Agosto - 2018

 R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 20, n. 2, p. 8 - 53, Maio/Agosto. 2018  32 that are not so close at the state level as to raise a doubt whether uncounted lawful votes might change the election outcome. 110 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision to engage in de novo review of Vice-President Gore’s request for manual recounts is consistent with the statutory contest language, not inconsistent with any binding Flo- rida precedent, and reconcilable with a statutory grant of discretion to local canvassing boards not to conduct manual recounts at the pro- test phase of election proceedings. In what alternate universe does such an interpretation of Florida election law qualify as “absurd”? Having found the statutory contest standard satisfied, the Flo- rida Supreme Court ordered a state-wide manual recount, notwiths- tanding the shortness of time. The court relied on the statutory pro- vision authorizing courts to order “any relief appropriate,” 111 once the threshold requirement for an election contest had been satisfied. The concurring opinion states that this reading of “appropriate relief” can- not be reconciled with the legislature’s “wish” to take advantage of the federal safe harbor provision. Yet, as we have seen, the legisla- ture expressed no such wish, and even if it had, reading Florida elec- tion law to elevate that wish over all competing considerations would be nonsensical. 112 The Florida Supreme Court ordered the statewide manual recount on December 8. In all likelihood, that recount would have been completed by December 12, had the Supreme Court not stayed it the morning it began (December 9). The recount almost certainly would have been completed by December 18–the date by which Florida electors had to be appointed in order to participate in the electoral college balloting. There is nothing odd about cons- truing “any relief appropriate” to include a statewide manual recount that probably could have been completed in time to avoid jeopardi- zing Florida’s participation in the electoral college vote. 113 Finally, the Gore team not only had the plain meaning of the 110 See Gore v. Harris , slip opinion at 61 (Harding, J., dissenting) (noting that the “abuse of discretion” standard applicable at the protest phase does not apply during the contest phase); Bush , slip opinion at 8 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 111 Fla. Stat. §102.168(8). 112 See supra __. 113 he concurring opinion notes that even if the manual recount could have been completed by December 12, “the inevitable legal challenges and ensuing appeals to the Supreme Court of Florida and petitions for certiorari to this Court could not possibly be completed by that date.” Bush , slip opinion at 11 (concurring opinion). It is not obvious this is true, especially since the relevant date is December 18, not December 12. But even if it were true, it is not obvious why a completed manual recount with uncompleted judicial challenges ought not to be preferred to a machine count that clearly missed thousands of ballots on which the voters’ intention could be discerned.