Direito em Movimento - Volume 16 - Número 2 - 2º semestre/2018

88 Direito em Movimento, Rio de Janeiro, v. 16 - n. 2, p. 72-105, 2º sem. 2018 ARTIGOS bidding an interpretation which limits the enjoyment or exercise of rights or liberties, and in article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which obliges them to be interpreted in good faith. As can be seen in this sentence, the Court inverted the interpretative logic and made a reading of private rights through the lenses of human rights, giving them a collective conception (until then inconceivable) in the environment of the Convention, before the individualistic logic upon which they were built. This hermeneutics results from the judge’s duty to “decide upon which principle better represents the reading of the flow of decisions to which he must give continuity 30 ” (in the current case: if the flow is individual or collective) and these interpretative dimensions must attend as much to formal characteristics (identity, coherence and integrity), as to substantial aspects of the norm in the light of the reality it is heading towards. For this reason, the interpreter should attribute value and purpose to practice in a way to justify his decision in the community’s environment, which is ruled by principles. In the hypothesis under study, the decision of the Court which refor- mulated the parameters of protection for the indigenous peoples identifies itself with the interpretation which did not limit itself to legal texts; it was oriented by principles. That is to say, a constructive hermeneutics was de- veloped, which “imposed a purpose upon an object or practice, to the end of turning it into the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong 31 ”. This question over interpretative criteria in hard cases is recurring in Dworkin’s work, being valid enough for an understanding of the act of decision. His theory is founded in the internal perspective of the judging organ, in criteria of decision justification and not in the identification of the materials upon which the juridical argument was constructed. Contrary to positivism, which upon separating the components of the decision seeks 30 DWORKIN, R. Uma questão de princípio . São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000, p. 239. 31 DWORKIN, R. O império do Direito . São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 1999, p. 64.